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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ABORTIONS: ABORTION AS A Nnrm A2miN-
BENT RiirT.- Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.
1970), appeal dismissed per curiam, 91 S. Ct. 12 (1970).
Plaintiff, a physician, allegedly performed a "nontherapeutic" abor-
tion upon a woman carrying an unquickened fetus and was subse-
quently prosecuted under the Wisconsin abortion statute.1 He brought
suit in federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the statute and
to obtain a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional.
The injunction was denied, but the declaratory judgment was granted. 2
Held: The state may not deprive a woman of her ninth amendment
right to decide whether to carry or reject an unquickened child.
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dis-
missed per curiam,8 91 S. Ct. 12 (1970).
The Babbitz decision is a departure from traditional constitutional
law. Prior to Babbitz few courts had relied upon the ninth amendment
to protect an unenumerated right4 and no court had invalidated an
1. Wis. STAT. AwN. § 940.04 (1958) provides as follows:
(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an
unborn child may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 3
years or both.
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
(a) Is performed by a physician; and
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life
of the mother; and
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital.
(6) In this section "unborn child" means a human being from the time of con-
ception until it is born alive.
2. The injunction was denied, as the court did not believe the circumstances in the
case warranted an exception to the anti-injunction policy set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1964) and case precedent. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943);
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). The court was free to grant a declaratory
judgment since the Supreme Court has ruled that a district court may decide ". . . the
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the
issuance of the injunction." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967).
3. Defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
The appeal was dismissed on the authority of Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970)
and Gunn v. University Committee to End the War, 399 U.S. 383 (1970). These cases
hold that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to review the
granting of a declaratory judgment by a district court.
4. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
The Supreme Court has seldom dealt directly with the ninth amendment and has
never protected a right on purely ninth amendment grounds. Although the Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was partially based
on the ninth amendment, the Court has not found it subsequently necessary to rely
upon the ninth amendment. Between the Griswold and Babbitz decisions federal courts
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abortion statute on ninth amendment grounds.5 This infrequent use of
the ninth amendment would seem contrary to both the language and
history of the amendment.6 The amendment was specifically included
within the Bill of Rights in order to safeguard rights not spelled out in
the Constitution. The rights reserved
7
were to be of a nature comparable with the rights enumerated.
They were 'retained . . .by the people' not because they were
different from the rights specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, but because words were considered inadequate to define
all of the rights which man should possess in a free society.
Because the Supreme Court has not used the ninth amendment as
envisioned, it has needed to employ other tools to protect unenumer-
ated rights. The Court has often broadened the scope of enumerated
rights to include unenumerated ones8 and has used the "due process"
clauses of the fourteenth' and the fifth'0 amendments to strike down
relied upon the ninth amendment but three times. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1969) (the right to wear one's hair at any desired length is protected by the first
or ninth amendment) ; accord, Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) ;
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970) (the liberty to dress as one desires
is protected by the ninth amendment). At least two federal courts have subsequently
utilized the ninth amendment. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 418 (D. Ver. 1970)
(the right to choose one's hair style is protected by the "first, ninth or fourteenth
amendments, or any combination of the above"); Mindel v. United States Civil Service
Comm., 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (post office termination of clerk's job, be-
cause of his private sexual life, held violative of "due process" and the ninth amend-
ment).
See Kent, Under the Ninth Amendment What Rights are the "Others Retained by the
People?", 29 FED. B.J. 219, 222-24 (1970) for a summary of court decisions in which
ninth amendment claims have been rejected.
5. Prior to Babbitz two courts had invalidated abortion statutes on vagueness grounds.
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd,
39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 1971). The Supreme Court held that the statute
involved in Vuitch was not unconstitutionally vague.
6. The history of the adoption of the ninth amendment is discussed in B. PATrRsoN,
THE FORGOTrEN NiNTH AMENDMENT (1955) [hereinafter cited as PATTERSON]; Com-
ment, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cmr. L. REv. 814,
815-25 (1966).
7. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights .. .Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 787, 810, 811 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Redlich].
8. E.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (first amendment protects
freedom of association); accord, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963); Louisiana
v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
9. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ("due process' protects the liberty to
marry an individual of another race); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) ("due process" protects the freedom of parents to direct the education and up-
bringing of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
("due process" protects the liberty to establish a home and bring up children).
10. E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ("due process" protects the liberty
to attend a non-segregated school).
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legislation that deprives individuals of "liberty--particularly liberty
in private family matters. 1
Griswold v. Connecticut'2 is the only decision in which the Supreme
Court has utilized the ninth amendment to protect an unenumerated
right. In Griswold the Court found a Connecticut statutory ban on
the use of contraceptives violative of the right of marital privacy.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion for the Court, demonstrated that the
first, third, fourth and fifth amendments protect various aspects of
individual privacy, 3 and apparently derived the right of marital privacy
from these guarantees by using the ninth amendment as a rule of
construction. 4 Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, used the
ninth amendment as a rule of construction 5 to discover the right of
marital privacy within the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 6
Both Justices Douglas and Goldberg indicated that while the state
could regulate marital behavior, the birth control statute unneces-
11. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Grirwold, although some
justices relied on the ninth amendment, the only ground generally agreed upon by the
Court was the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justices White and
Harlan based their decisions on the fourteenth amendment alone. Id. at 499-507.
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. Id. at 482-84.
14. Because Justice Douglas used the ninth amendment broadly to construe specific
Bill of Rights provisions, rather than seeing the amendment alone as protective of
marital privacy, he evidently believes that the ninth amendment is a rule of construction
and not a source of fundamental rights. The conclusion that Justice Douglas views the
ninth amendment in this light is supported by his concurring opinion in Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), where he quoted with approval a law review note which
had treated the ninth amendment as a rule of construction. 385 U.S. at 352-53, n.15.
Those who view the ninth amendment as a rule of construction perceive it as a
guidepost, pointing to other parts of the Constitution as the contexts within which
unenumerated rights are to be discovered. Former Justice Goldberg is of this school; he
explicitly denied that the ninth amendment is a source of fundamental rights. Griswold,
381 U.S. at 492. He instead used the ninth amendment to justify construing the
Iliberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment to include the right of marital privacy.
Id. at 486.
Commentators disagree about the correct interpretation of the ninth amendment. For
articles treating the ninth amendment as a rule of construction, see Kutner, The
Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L.
REv. 121 (1967); Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Impli-
cations for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 40 TL. L. Rnv. 487 (1966); Comment, The Uncertain Renaissance of
the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 814 (1966).
For articles treating the ninth amendment as an independent source of rights, see
Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PEN. L. REv. 1048, 1068-69
(1968); Redlich, supra note 7; and PATTERSON, supra note 6.
15. See note 14, supra.
16. "[NJor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
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sarily invaded the right of marital privacy. The Justices set out a
strict test for permissible state invasion of rights discovered through
the ninth amendment, 1 implicitly rejecting the holding of United
Public Workers v. Mitchell" that the government can infringe upon
ninth amendment rights whenever it has the power to legislate in a
particular area.
Griswold was the Supreme Court's most complete discussion of the
ninth amendment at the time that Dr. Babbitz challenged the Wis-
consin abortion statute. In determining the constitutionality of the
statute, the Babbitz court first rejected vagueness' 9 and equal pro-
tection20 arguments. The court responded to plaintiff's argument that
the statute abridged a mother's right of privacy 2' by asserting that
the law infringed upon a specific private right protected by the ninth
amendment-the right to decide whether or not to bear an unquickened
child.2 The court supported its determination of this right by dis-
17. Both Justice Douglas and Justice Goldberg stressed that the state could not
infringe upon the right of marital privacy through a statute that was "unnecessarily
broad." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485, 498. In addition, Justice Goldberg maintained that
a state could not encroach upon this fundamental right unless it demonstrated a "com-
pelling interest." Id. at 497-98.
18. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In United Public Workers, a case challenging the constitution-
ality of the Hatch Act's prohibition on political activity, the Court recognized a right
to engage in political activity. The Court refused to protect this right, however, because
Congress had the power to regulate the activities of government employees. The Court
noted: "If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of these rights,
reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail." Id. at 96.
19. 310 F. Supp. at 297-98. The challenged words in the Wisconsin statute, "necessary,
to save the life of the mother," are similar to those in a repealed California statute
("necessary to preserve her life"). Ch. 99, § 45 [1850] Cal. Sess. Laws 233, as amended by
ch. 528, § 1 [1935] Cal. Sess. Laws 1605. This later statute was declared unconstitution-
ally vague by the California Supreme Court. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). The Babbitz court,
commenting on the Belous opinion, stated: "[W]e do not share the view of the majority
in Belous that such language is so vague that one must guess at its meaning." 310 F.
Supp. at 298. See note 5, supra.
20. 310 F. Supp. at 298. Plaintiff contended that the statute denied him equal
protection because medical facilities were not constant throughout Wisconsin. Conse-
quently, doctors in rural and urban areas might not always find it "necessary" to perform
abortions in the same type of case. In addition, plaintiff urged that the statute denied
poor women equal protection, since they, unlike wealthy women, could not afford to
obtain safe and legal abortions by journeying to other locales. Although the Babbitz
court found "more cogency" in this latter argument, they rejected it. They stated: "We
are reluctant to equate these types of inequality with a denial of a protected right under
tho fourteenth amendment." Id.
21. Id. at 295.
22. Id. at 299, 302. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether plaintiff argued that
the right to privacy is a ninth amendment right or whether the court raised the point
on its own motion.
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cussing prior Supreme Court opinions,23 including Griswold, and by
alluding to federal district court 4 and state supreme court 5 opinions
on abortion.
After "establishing" the ninth amendment right to an abortion, the
Babbitz court prescribed a test for determining the validity of state
regulation of this ninth amendment right: a state can only infringe
upon a fundamental right if it has a "compelling interest," and then
only through a narrowly drawn statute.20 The court derived this test
both from the Griswold opinion 7 and from the statement in Bates v.
City of Little Rock 28 that, "[w]here there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling."
The tribunal in Babbitz concluded that the abortion statute could
not survive this test.29 The state could not justify the statute as a
health measure, since abortions are now relatively safe. Nor could the
statute be justified as a means of discouraging non-marital sexual
intercourse, since the broad abortion statute did not make any dis-
tinction between married and unmarried women. Finally, the state
was unable to justify the statute by asserting an interest in the con-
tinued existence of the fetus, because the court arbitrarily stated that
the mother's interest was superior to that of an unquickened child,
thereby deftly avoiding all philosophical arguments on the relative
interests of mother and unborn child.
23. See cases cited note 9, supra. The court would appear correct in concluding that
these prior Supreme Court decisions are suggestive of a right to abortion. It can be
argued, however, that Supreme Court pronouncements do not compel a conclusion that
the right to abortion is a ninth amendment right. Except in Griswold, the Supreme
Court has never utilized the 9th amendment to protect familial privacy. Since Griswold,
the Supreme Court has not relied upon the ninth amendment in any opinion.
24. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 39
U.S.L.W. 4453 (US. April 21, 1971). The district court speculated that a woman's
right of privacy might include the right to remove an unwanted child in early stages
of pregnancy. The Supreme Court did not deal with this issue. See note 5, supra.
25. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). The Belous court noted: "The fundamental right of
the woman to choose whether to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and
this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters
related to marriage, family, and sex."
26. 310 F. Supp. at 301.
27. In Griswold the Court stated: "A governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
381 U.S. at 485.
28. 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
29. 310 F. Supp. at 30L
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The decision to treat abortion as a fundamental right can be at-
tacked on at least two grounds: 1) the court may have expanded the
concept of "fundamental rights" to an undue extent by including
abortion; 0 and 2) the court failed to provide any reasoned support
for its conclusion "that the mother's right transcends that of such an
embryo."'" The purpose of this Note, however, is not to criticize the
court but rather to ascertain what conclusions the court has drawn
about the purpose and use of the ninth amendment and to describe,
where appropriate, alternative approaches to those taken by the court.
Examination indicates that the court has implicitly drawn five
conclusions about the ninth amendment. First, the court has con-
cluded that the ninth amendment is a source of fundamental rights
rather than a rule of construction." This conclusion is evidenced by
reliance on the ninth amendment alone to protect the right of abortion.
Had the court believed that the ninth amendment was a rule of
construction, it would have used the amendment as in Griswold, to
interpret liberally other constitutional provisions, and would then
have concluded that the ninth amendment, coupled with these other
constitutional guarantees, protects the right to an abortion.
The court's conclusion that the ninth amendment is a source of
fundamental rights is supported by both the wording and history of
the amendment. The ninth amendment was adopted in order to
insure that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." 3 This language is certainly not typical of a rule of con-
struction. 4 Nor has the United States Supreme Court ever asserted
that the ninth amendment is not a source of fundamental rights.35
30. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text, infra.
31. 310 F. Supp. at 301.
32. See note 14, supra.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
34. One commentator argues:
Nor does the language of the ninth amendment or the context of its enactment
indicate that it was designed simply as a canon of liberal constitutional construc-
tion, a kind of necessary and proper clause saying, in effect: The provisions of the
foregoing amendments shall be liberally construed to extend to those rights implied
therein though not expressly set forth. Madison would not likely have used the
oblique language of the amendment and of his congressional explanation to express
that conventional legal idea.
Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PElNw. L. RV. 1048, 1069
(1969).
35. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) the Supreme Court
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Only in Griswold, where the Court used the ninth amendment together
with other constitutional provisions to vindicate the right of marital
privacy, did the Supreme Court give any indication that the ninth
amendment may only be a rule of construction. Yet, even in Griswold,
the majority did not aver that the ninth amendment cannot be used
by itself to protect unenumerated rights.86
A second implicit conclusion of the Babbitz court was that the ninth
amendment is a direct restriction on state activity. This conclusion
is evidenced by the court's reliance on the ninth amendment alone
rather than on the ninth and fourteenth amendments as the basis of
its decision.87 Most commentators, in contrast to the Babbitz court,
would apply the ninth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.88
A third conclusion drawn by the .Babbitz court about the ninth
amendment was that a state can infringe upon a ninth amendment
right only if it demonstrates a "compelling interest" and then only
through a narrowly drawn statute3 9 The court therefore utilized the
implicitly acknowledged that the ninth amendment is a source of fundamental rights.
The Court stated: "We accept appellants' contention that the nature of political rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are involved. The right
claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party official or
worker . . . ." Id. at 94.
36. See note 14 and accompanying text, supra.
37. However, even if the court had concluded that the ninth amendment is only
directly restrictive of federal activity, it could still have protected the right to an
abortion by holding that the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment incor-
porates or absorbs ninth amendment guarantees. Most of the enumerated Bill of Rights
protections have been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. E.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment freedom of speech
and press). Justices Black and Douglas believe that the fourteenth amendment safe-
guards all of the Bill of Rights liberties from state infringement. E.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 163 (concurring opinion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at
346 (concurring opinion). Many other Supreme Court justices, however, have concluded
that the fourteenth amendment does not absorb or incorporate all of the Bill of Rights
protections. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 172 (dissenting opinion); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964).
To hold that the ninth amendment operates directly on state activity and not through
the fourteenth amendment may suggest that it also directly restricts private interferences
with ninth amendment rights. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text, infra.
38. E.g., Redlich, supra note 7, at 805-06; Comment, The Uncertain Renaissance of
the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 814, 831 (1966). But see PATTuRsoN, supra
note 6, at 36-43. In Breen, 419 F.2d at 1034, Reichenberg, 310 F. Supp. at 248, and
Crossen, 309 F. Supp. at 114, the ninth amendment is applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note 4, supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 26-28, supra. By adopting this standard the
Babbitz court rejected the conclusion of United Public Workers, 330 US. at 75. See note
18, supra.
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same standard of protection for a ninth amendment right that the
Supreme Court has adopted to protect first amendment rights40 and
the unenumerated rights of travel41 and marital privacy. 2 It was
appropriate for the district court to develop a stringent test for en-
croachment of ninth amendment rights, since these protections were
originally designed to be as rigorous as the more specific Bill of
Rights guarantees.43
A fourth conclusion implicit in Babbitz was that the method of
stare decisis should be used to identify ninth amendment rights. This
conclusion may be inferred from the court's methodology, i.e. an
examination of prior court decisions and the rights protected therein.44
The method of stare decisis, used alone, does not appear to be an
adequate methodology through which to identify ninth amendment
rights. There is no assurance that courts will identify as ninth amend-
ment rights only those interests that are of an importance comparable
to enumerated rights. The right to an abortion, for instance, is argu-
ably not of the same significance as freedom of the press or speech.
The unenumerated rights of privacy and self determination," how-
ever, do seem to be of this stature. Moreover, the method of stare
decisis will not preclude courts from identifying an abundance of
special interests as ninth amendment rights. If courts begin to label
all special interests as "rights," the word "right" will cease to have
special meaning and status.
The following criteria would seem useful in determining what rights
are protected by the ninth amendment.4
1. The right should meet the test of historic justification. His-
torical evidence must show that the right is not a new creation.
40. E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 66 (1960).
41. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidation of a statute abridg-
ing the right to travel because the state did not demonstrate a "compelling interest").
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
43. See note 7 and accompanying text, supra.
44. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text, supra.
45. If courts were to recognize the right of self determination, as a ninth amend-
ment right, abortion could be considered one form of behavior protected by this
guarantee. Similarly, freedom of the press now protects various forms of activity,
including the distribution of handbills. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
46. Comment, Ninth Amendment Vindication of Unenumerated Rights, 42 Tmf=L
L.Q. 46, 54, 55 (1968).
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2. The right should be pervasive. It must be a right that most
citizens exercise or could exercise frequently.
3. The right should encroach minimally on the exercise of funda-
mental rights by others.
Had the instant court tested the right to an abortion on the above
scale, it might have concluded that this right fails to meet two, or
perhaps all three, criteria.4 7 Freedom of speech and the right to
privacy, in contrast, pass all of the forenamed tests.
The Babbitz tribunal could also have employed a process of
"analogy to constitutional text"48 to determine whether the right to
an abortion is a ninth amendment right. To use this method courts
should first study the specific rights and governmental patterns pro-
tected by our Constitution, in order to discern the ideals reflected.
Then, after perceiving these underlying values, they can better deduce
which interests are ninth amendment rights. Justice Douglas used
this analogic technique in Griswold to discover the right of marital
privacy. By thorough study of the interests protected by the first,
third, fourth, and fifth amendments, he was able to conclude that our
constitutional system protects the privacy of the individual.49 Had
the Babbitz tribunal employed this procedure it might not have
concluded that the right not to bear a child is a ninth amendment
right. °
The method of "analogy to constitutional text" would seem to be
a valuable aid in the search for ninth amendment rights. Since this
technique requires intensive study of the Constitution, it should at
least partially ensure that only basic and pervasive interests will be
identified as ninth amendment rights. The method of "analogy,"
47. Abortion has not been long basic to our way of life or the abortion issue would
not be presented in the way it is today. Nor is the right to abortion pervasive. Neither
men, nor women after the menopause can ever expect to exercise it. Finally, many
individuals believe that abortions encroach upon the rights of an unquickened child.
48. A number of scholars believe that the method of "analogy" should be used to fill
in the content of the ninth amendment. E.g., Black, The Unfinished Business of the
Warren Court, 46 WAsH. L. REv. 3, 37-45 (1970); Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as
Civil Law Method and Its Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold
v. Connecticut; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 ToV. L. REv. 487 (1966).
49. 381 U.S. at 482-485.
50. It can be argued that the Constitution does not protect any rights analogous
to the "right" to an abortion. The nineteenth amendment is the only amendment to
secure for women a specific right, the right to vote. The guarantee of suffrage, however,
differs from the "right" to an abortion in that it involves freedom of choice in political
rather than personal matters.
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however, should not be used alone, since the Constitutional text may
not contain the basis of all man's rights. Instead, to determine ninth
amendment rights courts should initially use both the methods of
"analogy" and stare decisis. Then, any possible "rights" discovered
through this process should be evaluated in light of the three point
scale set out above.5'
The fifth conclusion implicit in the Babbitz decision is that the
ninth amendment is a viable tool for the protection of unenumerated
rights. The court declined to rest its decision on the "due process"
clause of the fourteenth amendment and therefore bypassed an oppor-
tunity to state that the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment includes the liberty to obtain an abortion. This expanded view
of the due process clause is suggested by prior Supreme Court opin-
ions.52
The Babbitz court did not indicate why it chose to utilize the
ninth rather than the fourteenth amendment as the basis for its
decision. Perhaps the Babbitz judges shared the general judicial dis-
taste for fourteenth amendment substantive "due process."53 Alterna-
tively, the tribunal may have believed that a new constitutional tool
would better serve the needs of present society. Today, because of the
advances in science and the individualism of youth, a host of new
rights press for recognition, e.g. the right to sexual freedom, the right
to work, the right to an abortion, and the right to wear long hair.
Courts may prefer to deal with those new interests through an amend-
ment that is not laden with precedent.
An additional possibility is that the Babbitz court chose to utilize
the ninth amendment because it recognized that the amendment may
51. See note 46 and accompanying text, supra.
52. See notes 9 and 23, supra.
53. The "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment was used extensively
during the first third of the 20th century to invalidate state social and economic
legislation which was perceived as infringing upon unenumerated rights. See, e.g.,
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. State of New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). Later, many of these earlier opinions were reversed. The Supreme
Court recognized that it had often substituted its own judgment for that of the legisla-
ture and refused to do so any longer. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) ;
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Courts are now reluctant to invalidate social legislation on
fourteenth amendment substantive grounds, as they are mindful of past abuse.
It should be noted, however, that the ninth amendment concept of "unenumerated
rights" when viewed as a source of fundamental rights could be used every bit as
broadly and as subjectively as "substantive" due process.
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be a restriction on both private and governmental activity. Two ninth
amendment scholars have previously suggested this novel proposi-
tion,)5 4 and the suggestion seems plausible, because the words of the
ninth amendment, unlike those of the fourteenth amendment, do not
indicate that the provision is only a restriction on state activity. 5 If
the ninth amendment is a limitation on private action, the amendment
could be used as an effective tool to protect individuals from the arbi-
trary acts of unions, professional associations, or corporations.
It is unclear whether the present Supreme Court will follow the
lead of the Babbitz tribunal in using the ninth amendment to protect
unenumerated liberties. After the great changes in constitutional law
during the Warren era, the present Court may prefer to stay within
established constitutional tradition. Babbitz, however, will serve as a
reminder to the legal profession that the ninth amendment is a feasible
and open tool by which to protect "the other rights retained by the
people."56
54. PATTmnsor, supra note 6, at 4; Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The
"Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. Rnv. 121, 141 (1967).
55. Although it is arguable that the ninth amendment was specifically adopted to
limit governmental activity, this argument can be countered by pointing out that the
Framers believed that man has certain inherent natural rights, which no one should be
able to encroach upon. See PATTR SoN, supra note 6, at 4, 19-21. Had the drafters of
the ninth amendment recognized that the unions and corporations of the 20th century
would become as great a threat to liberty as the governments of the 18th century, they
might well have provided expressly that the ninth amendment restrict non-governmental
power.
56. For a discussion of rights which could be protected by the ninth amendment,
see Kent, Under the Ninth Amendment What Rights Are the "Others Retained by the
People?", 29 FED. B.J. 219, 226-37 (1970); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment:
The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MaRQ. L. yzv. 121, 134-42 (1967).
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